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THE ANTI-COMPETITIVE POTENTIAL OF CROSS-MARKET 
MERGERS IN HEALTH CARE 
JAIME S. KING* AND ERIN C. FUSE BROWN** 
ABSTRACT 
Health care consolidation in the United States has been widespread at all 
levels and across all entities. This consolidation has extended beyond horizontal 
mergers of hospitals or other providers to include out-of-market mergers, or 
cross-market mergers. Cross-market mergers include the merger or acquisition 
of any health care entity that does not directly compete with the acquiring entity 
in the same product or geographic market. Antitrust enforcers have historically 
had little in the way of market theory, economic models, or empirical data to 
inform their analyses on the potential impacts of cross-market mergers on 
competition. However, recent developments in economic theory and empirical 
studies now offer evidence that cross-market mergers can, in some instances, 
harm competition and drive price increases in health care markets when a 
common insurer exists across those markets. This article aims to start a 
discussion among the health policy and antitrust communities about the 
potential for cross-market acquisitions to harm competition, whether existing 
antitrust laws could theoretically support a challenge to a cross-market 
acquisition, and the practical challenges to doing so. This article will argue that 
health policy analysts, antitrust enforcers, and academics should begin to 
consider the anti-competitive potential of cross-market acquisitions and develop 
a means to analyze them both legally and economically. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last several decades, the U.S. health care system has experienced 
unprecedented provider, insurer, and pharmaceutical company consolidation.1 
This consolidation generated significant concerns among consumers, employers, 
health services researchers, and government entities, especially in light of ever-
rising prices in all facets of health care.2 Unfortunately, these concerns proved 
warranted: The U.S. health care pricing problem is largely a provider market 
power problem.3 Within the same geographic area, prices for health care 
services can vary up to 60% for inpatient services and up to 100% for outpatient 
services between the highest- and lowest-priced hospitals.4 Further, health 
services research demonstrates that provider market power drives these 
variations in price, rather than differences in quality, payor mix, demographics, 
or health of the patient population.5 In other words, higher-price providers rarely 
 
 1. Martin Gaynor et al., Making Health Care Markets Work: Competition Policy for Health 
Care, 317 JAMA 1313, 1313–14 (2017). 
 2. See ERIN C. FUSE BROWN, NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, STATE 
STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS RISING PRICES CAUSED BY HEALTH CARE CONSOLIDATIONS 1 (Sept. 
2017), http://www.nashp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Consolidation-Report.pdf; see also 
Robert Berenson, Acknowledging the Elephant: Moving Market Power and Prices to the Center of 
Health Policy, HEALTH AFF. BLOG: FOLLOWING THE ACA (June 3, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/ 
blog/2014/06/03/acknowledging-the-elephant-moving-market-power-and-prices-to-the-center-of-
health-policy/; Health Care Market Consolidations: Impacts on Costs, Quality and Access, 2015-
2016 Leg., 413th Sess. 1–2 (Cal. 2016) (statement of Paul B. Ginsburg), https://www.brookings. 
edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Ginsburg-California-Senate-Health-Mar-16-1.pdf. 
 3. See, e.g., PAUL B. GINSBURG, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, WIDE 
VARIATION IN HOSPITAL AND PHYSICIAN PAYMENT RATES EVIDENCE OF PROVIDER MARKET 
POWER 6–7 (Nov. 2010), http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/1162/1162.pdf; CHAPIN WHITE ET 
AL., CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, HIGH AND VARYING PRICES FOR PRIVATELY 
INSURED PATIENTS UNDERSCORE HOSPITAL MARKET POWER 1 (Sept. 2013), http://www.hs 
change.org/CONTENT/1375/1375.pdf; Robert A. Berenson et al., The Growing Power of Some 
Providers to Win Steep Payment Increases from Insurers Suggests Policy Remedies May Be 
Needed, 31 HEALTH AFF. 973, 973 (2012); Berenson, supra note 2; see also FUSE BROWN, supra 
note 2, at 2. 
 4. WHITE ET AL., supra note 3, at 2. 
 5. See, e.g., MARTHA COAKLEY, MASS. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., EXAMINATION OF 
HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS AND COST DRIVERS: REPORT FOR ANNUAL PUBLIC HEARING 2 
(2011), http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/healthcare/2011-hcctd-full.pdf; Joseph P. Newhouse & 
Alan M. Garber, Geographic Variation in Health Care Spending in the United States: Insights from 
an Institute of Medicine Report, 310 JAMA 1227, 1227–28 (2013) (“[P]rice variation is responsible 
for an estimated 70% of the total geographic variation in spending among privately insured persons. 
Variation in wage levels and variation in the quantity of services delivered are almost equally 
responsible for the remaining estimated 30% of spending variation.”); Zack Cooper et al., The Price 
Ain’t Right? Hospital Prices and Health Spending on the Privately Insured 3, 33 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21815, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21815 
(concluding that hospital market structure, that is, the degree of competition in the market, is 
strongly associated with hospital prices); GINSBURG, supra note 3, at 7. 
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provide better care or treat patients with more complicated diagnoses; they 
simply have more market leverage.6  
Health care consolidation has been widespread at all levels and across all 
entities. Initially, hospitals, individual physicians, and provider groups merged 
horizontally with direct competitors.7 Next, hospital systems formed and began 
acquiring additional hospitals, while physician practice groups began to form 
larger group practices.8 In more recent years, consolidation has extended beyond 
horizontal mergers of hospitals or physician organizations to include non-
horizontal, or “cross-market mergers.”9 Cross-market mergers include the 
merger or acquisition of any health care entity that does not directly compete 
with the acquiring entity in the same product or geographic market.10 Cross-
market mergers can include the acquisition of a physician organization by a 
hospital system (commonly referred to as vertical health care integration), the 
purchase of a local community hospital in a rural or suburban area by a hospital 
system in a major city, or the acquisition of a single-specialty physician group 
by a larger provider organization in a different market.11 This article will focus 
on geographic cross-market mergers in which a merger occurs between health 
care entities in different geographic markets. 
Modern health care mergers often involve horizontal, vertical, and cross-
market integration of providers, and in some instances the integration of an 
insurance entity as well.12 This multifaceted combination of competitors and 
market complements greatly complicates antitrust analysis. Unfortunately, 
antitrust enforcers have had little in the way of market theory, economic models, 
or empirical data to inform their analyses on the potential impacts of geographic 
 
 6. See, e.g., COAKLEY, supra note 5; GINSBURG, supra note 3, at 2–3. 
 7. See GINSBURG, supra note 3, at 7; Kelly J. Devers et al., Hospitals’ Negotiating Leverage 
with Health Plans: How and Why Has It Changed? 38 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 419, 427 (2003). 
 8. See GINSBURG, supra note 3, at 7. 
 9. See Leemore Dafny, Kate Ho & Robin S. Lee, The Price Effects of Cross-Market Hospital 
Mergers 29–30 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22106, 2016), http://www.n 
ber.org/papers/w22106 (revised June 2017). 
 10. See, e.g., Gregory S. Vistnes & Yianis Sarafidis, Cross-Market Hospital Mergers: A 
Holistic Approach, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 253, 254, 289 (2013); Joe Cantlupe, New Scrutiny for 
Hospital Mergers, NEW ENG. J. MED. CATALYST (Nov. 29, 2016), https://catalyst.nejm.org/scru 
tiny-hospital-cross-market-mergers/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
 11. See David A. Argue & Scott D. Stein, Cross-Market Health Care Provider Mergers: The 
Next Enforcement Frontier 30 ANTITRUST 25, 25 (2015). 
 12. Prior to the 1982 Merger Guidelines and their 1984 revisions, courts divided non-
horizontal mergers into vertical and conglomerate (which this article refers to as cross-market) 
mergers. ROBERT S. SCHLOSSBERG, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: UNDERSTANDING THE 
ANTITRUST ISSUES 475–76 (Am. Bar Ass’n, 3d ed. 2008). The Supreme Court has defined a 
conglomerate merger as “one in which there are no economic relationships between the acquiring 
and acquired firm,” while lower courts and commentators often label non-horizontal and non-
vertical mergers as conglomerates. Id. at 475 (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Proctor & Gamble 
Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 n.2 (1967)). 
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cross-market mergers on competition in health care. In antitrust circles, the 
assumption has always been that geographic cross-market mergers, by 
definition, were not anti-competitive because the merging entities did not 
compete against one another.13 However, recent developments in economic 
theory and empirical studies now offer evidence that geographic cross-market 
mergers can harm competition and drive price increases in health care markets 
under certain circumstances.14 While these findings, accompanied by anecdotal 
reports from insurance companies claiming that cross-market provider mergers 
were contributing to higher reimbursement rates, have piqued the interest of the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), antitrust 
enforcers have yet to challenge a cross-market health care merger.15 
This article aims to start a discussion among the health policy and antitrust 
communities about the potential for cross-market acquisitions to harm 
competition, whether existing antitrust laws could theoretically support a 
challenge to a cross-market acquisition, and the practical challenges to doing so. 
This article examines the applicability of the emerging economic models and 
empirical evidence on geographic cross-market mergers in health care for 
antitrust enforcement purposes, presents the case that antitrust enforcers should 
consider these theories in evaluating cross-market mergers, and discusses the 
attendant challenges of doing so. Part I describes geographic cross-market 
mergers and the forces that led to their rise in health care markets. Part II traces 
the historical evolution of health care antitrust merger enforcement as it adapted 
to changes in the economic evidence of health care market dynamics. Part III 
outlines the theoretical model and empirical economic evidence of how 
geographic cross-market mergers can lead to anti-competitive price increases. 
Part IV sets forth the legal foundations for bringing a cross-market merger 
challenge and then identifies areas where further economic and legal analysis is 
needed. The article concludes that health policy analysts, antitrust enforcers, and 
academics should begin to consider the anti-competitive potential of geographic 
cross-market acquisitions and develop a means to analyze them both legally and 
economically in a much-needed effort to avoid further market consolidation and 
price increases in health care.  
 
 13. See Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 10, at 254–55. 
 14. Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 2, 29–30; Matthew S. Lewis & Kevin E. Pflum, Hospital 
Systems and Bargaining Power: Evidence from Out-of-Market Acquisitions, 48 RAND J. ECON. 
579, 603–04 (2017). 
 15. See Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Remarks at the Fed. 
Trade Comm’n & Dept. of Justice Workshop: Examining Healthcare Competition 6 (Feb. 24, 2015) 
(transcript available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/618591/tran 
script-day1.pdf). 
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I.  CROSS-MARKET MERGERS 
Cross-market mergers in health care involve the merger of health care 
entities that do not operate in the same geographic or product markets.16 This 
article will use the term “cross-market” to describe health care acquisitions 
across geographic markets, regardless of whether the entities offer the same or 
different products. For example, the merger of hospitals in different counties or 
the acquisition by a hospital system of a home-health agency in a different 
metropolitan area would be such a geographic cross-market merger. Under the 
broad definition, cross-market mergers also include so-called vertical 
acquisitions of physicians by hospital systems because the two entities offer 
different products (physician versus hospital services).17 However, because the 
early data on cross-market mergers focused on geographic cross-market 
mergers, this article will also focus on this subset of cross-market mergers, 
referring to mergers among hospitals and physicians as “vertical” to reflect the 
separate literature regarding hospital-physician mergers.18 Cross-market (and 
vertical) mergers can be contrasted with horizontal or within-market health care 
mergers that compete in both the same geographic and product markets, such as 
the consolidation of two hospitals located in the same metropolitan area into a 
single hospital system.  
Cross-market mergers are increasingly common. From 2000 to 2010, 
roughly one-third of hospital mergers involved cross-market acquisitions.19 
According to another calculation, between 2000 and 2012, more than half of the 
528 general acute care hospital mergers involved hospitals or health systems in 
different geographic areas.20 Prominent examples of national cross-market 
health care mergers include the 2014 acquisition of 71-hospital Health 
Management by 135-hospital Community Health System for $3.9 billion, as 
well as the 2013 merger of Dallas-based Baylor Health Care System and 
Temple-based Scott White Health, creating a 43-hospital combined entity with 
more than 6000 affiliated physicians.21 However, cross-market mergers also can 
be more regional, such as the growth of Sutter Health in Northern California to 
dominate the areas spanning from San Francisco to Sacramento or the growth of 
Partners Healthcare in Eastern Massachusetts beyond Central Boston to include 
 
 16. Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 2. 
 17. See Caroline S. Carlin et al., The Impact of Provider Consolidation on Physician Prices, 
HEALTH ECON. 1, 2 (2017). 
 18. See, e.g., id. 
 19. Matthew S. Lewis & Kevin E.  Pflum, Diagnosing Hospital System Bargaining Power in 
Managed Care Networks, 7 AM. ECON. J. 243, 244 (2014). 
 20. Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 1 (defining geographic areas as Core Based Statistical 
Areas, which are metropolitan statistical areas for larger cities and micropolitan areas for smaller 
towns). 
 21. Id. at 1 & n.3. 
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physician groups, clinics, and community hospitals spanning from Cape Cod to 
New Hampshire.22  
Despite antitrust agencies’ focus on horizontal health care mergers,23 the 
trend of cross-market mergers is growing in importance. The vast majority of 
hospital markets in major metropolitan areas are already highly concentrated,24 
narrowing the options for further concentration in many of those markets. 
Similarly, many rural areas struggle to support more than one health system.25 
Barriers to entry also make it difficult for new firms to open new hospitals as a 
means of growth.26 As a result, cross-market mergers are likely to increasingly 
dominate the growth strategy of health care providers.  
Under prevailing antitrust enforcement approaches, cross-market mergers in 
health care have largely escaped antitrust scrutiny. The DOJ’s and FTC’s 
traditional view under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines was that mergers across 
geographic markets did not affect competition because the merging firms did not 
directly compete in the same geographic or product markets—they were not 
substitutes at the point of service for any given patient—rendering them either 
pro-competitive or competitively neutral.27 Without economic evidence to 
suggest otherwise, U.S. antitrust enforcers have been reluctant to challenge 
cross-market mergers.  
At the same time, growth of health care systems through acquisition (as 
opposed to building new facilities) has become an industry imperative for 
providers, and many of these acquisitions have occurred across geographic 
markets.28 Left unchecked, cross-market acquisitions will continue to allow 
 
 22. See DAVID DRANOVE, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT., FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT IN HEALTH CARE (Mar. 2014), https://www.nihcm.org/component/content/article/ 
6-expert-voices/1272-federal-antitrust-enforcement?showall=1. 
 23. Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 10, at 254. 
 24. E.g., David M. Cutler & Fiona Scott Morton, Hospitals, Market Share, and Consolidation, 
310 JAMA 1964, 1966 (2013) (noting that nearly half of all U.S. hospital markets are highly 
concentrated); STEPHEN ZUCKERMAN & JOHN HOLAHAN, URBAN INST. HEALTH POLICY CTR., 
DESPITE CRITICISM, THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT DOES MUCH TO CONTAIN HEALTH CARE 
COSTS 2 (Oct. 2012), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412665-Despite-Criticism-The-Afford 
able-Care-Act-Does-Much-to-Contain-Health-Care-Cost.pdf (noting that as of the mid-2000s, 
eighty-eight percent of hospital markets in large metropolitan areas are highly concentrated). 
 25. See KEVIN J. BENNETT ET AL., S.C. RURAL HEALTH RESEARCH CTR., VULNERABLE 
RURAL COUNTIES: THE CHANGING RURAL LANDSCAPE, 2000-2010 12 (July 2016), 
http://rhr.sph.sc.edu/report/(13-4)Vulnerable_Rural_Counties_The_Changing_Rural_Landscape_ 
2000-2010.pdf (reporting that “[m]ore than one-fourth of all remote rural counties did not have a 
hospital in 2010” and there have been seventy-five additional rural hospital closures since 2010). 
 26. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COMPETITION AND BARRIERS TO ENTRY 1 
(Jan. 2007), http://www.oecd.org/competition/mergers/37921908.pdf. 
 27. See, e.g., Argue & Stein, supra note 11, at 25–26. 
 28. See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text. 
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health care systems to grow and charge excessive prices while evading antitrust 
scrutiny.29 
II.  THE EVIDENCE-BASED EVOLUTION OF MERGER ENFORCEMENT 
PHILOSOPHY 
Economics and antitrust law are inextricably linked. As the U.S. Supreme 
Court noted in Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, as knowledge and 
understanding of economics evolves, so should antitrust law and its 
enforcement.30 This mutual evolution of economics and antitrust law has 
occurred numerous times as new developments have modified traditional 
understanding of the economic impact of certain types of mergers and 
acquisitions.31 When economists evaluate a particular industry, they develop 
theoretical models that attempt to capture key features of its competitive 
market.32 They then use empirical data to test their theoretical models.33 If the 
empirical data validates the model, economists can then use both the theory and 
the analytical model to make predictions about the potential impact of a 
particular market event, like a merger or acquisition.34 In recent years, advances 
in economic modeling of health care markets have resulted in significant 
advances in the agencies’ ability to predict the impact of mergers and 
acquisitions, resulting in a string of successful antitrust challenges to horizontal 
health care mergers.35 Now, economic evidence has begun to demonstrate the 
anti-competitive potential of cross-market mergers in health care, and the time 
has come again to consider adapting current understanding and interpretation of 
antitrust law.36 This part describes how developments in economic evidence 
have historically altered antitrust analysis of horizontal and vertical mergers in 
health care.  
Three federal laws protect competition in American markets: the Sherman 
Act,37 the Clayton Act,38 and the Federal Trade Commission Act.39 Antitrust 
 
 29. See Robert A. Berenson et al., Unchecked Provider Clout in California Foreshadows 
Challenges to Health Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 699, 702 (2010); see also Berenson et al., supra 
note 3, at 976. 
 30. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2412–13 (2015) (The U.S. Supreme Court 
stated that it has “felt relatively free to revise [its] legal analysis as economic understanding evolves 
and . . . to reverse antitrust precedents that misperceived a practice’s competitive consequences.”). 
 31. See discussion infra Sections II.A, II.C. 
 32. Cory S. Capps, From Rockford to Joplin and Back Again: The Impact of Economics on 
Hospital Merger Enforcement, 59 ANTITRUST BULL. 443, 447 (2014). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 444–46. 
 36. See e.g., Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 2; Lewis & Pflum, supra note 14, at 2–3. 
 37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–11 (2012). 
 38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2012). 
 39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–45 (2012). 
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enforcers typically rely upon Section 7 of the Clayton Act to challenge mergers 
and acquisitions.40 Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits acquisitions where the 
effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a 
monopoly.”41 In 1950, Congress amended Section 7 to broaden its applicability 
from activities that lessen existing competition between the merging parties to 
those that lessen competition in any line of commerce.42 As a result, antitrust 
enforcers can enjoin any merger with “probable anticompetitive effect[s].”43 
However, antitrust enforcers’ views of which mergers have sufficient potential 
for anti-competitive effects to warrant a challenge have evolved over time in 
tandem with developments in economic evidence. 
A. Horizontal Merger Enforcement 
Antitrust enforcement tools for analyzing the potential impact of horizontal 
mergers are the most well developed because the economic models and evidence 
for the effects of horizontal mergers are similarly well developed. Horizontal 
mergers enhance market power by eliminating competition between the parties 
(“unilateral effects”), or combining assets and market share of former 
competitors and facilitating collusion (“coordinated effects”).44 As noted above, 
antitrust review of horizontal mergers proceeds under Section 7 of the Clayton 
 
 40. David Narrow, Antitrust Overview, in CHRISTINE L. WHITE ET AL., ANTITRUST AND 
HEALTHCARE: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, § 2-1(a)(2) (2013). 
 41. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
 42. Clayton Act, ch. 1184, § 7, 64 Stat. 1125, 1125–26 (1950) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 
18 (2012)). 
 43. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962); accord Fed. Trade Comm’n 
v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967) (“All mergers are within the reach of § 7, and 
all must be tested by the same standard, whether they are classified as horizontal, vertical, 
conglomerate or other. As noted by the Commission, this merger is neither horizontal, vertical, nor 
conglomerate. Since the products of the acquired company are complementary to those of the 
acquiring company and may be produced with similar facilities, marketed through the same 
channels and in the same manner, and advertised by the same media, the Commission aptly called 
this acquisition a ‘product-extension merger.’”); United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 
526, 531 (1973) (citing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578–80 (1967) 
for the proposition that Section 7 “also bars certain acquisitions of a market competitor by a 
noncompetitor, such as a merger by an entrant who threatens to dominate the market or otherwise 
upset market conditions to the detriment of competition.”); id. at 556–58 (Marshall, J., concurring) 
(citing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967) and the 1950 
amendment for the proposition that Section 7 could apply beyond the elimination of actual present 
competition). European antitrust law takes a similar position; an acquisition can be prohibited when 
it “creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition in the 
common market or in a substantial part of it would be significantly impeded.” Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 
2004 O.J. (L 24) 1, 3 (discussing Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of December 21, 1989). 
 44. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2 
(Aug. 19, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819 
hmg.pdf. 
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Act.45 Traditional horizontal merger analysis requires the enforcer to: (1) define 
the market, including the product and geographic market parameters and the 
barriers to entry,46 (2) determine the market share based on revenues,47 (3) 
determine the existing market concentration and the change in market 
concentration resulting from the merger via the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI),48 (4) determine whether the merger will significantly increase 
concentration in the relevant market, giving rise to a presumption of anti-
competitive effects,49 and (5) consider the balance of pro- and anti-competitive 
effects of the merger,50 including the potential for merger-specific efficiency 
gains,51 unilateral effects,52 coordinated effects,53 and customer or supplier 
reactions.54 Despite little doubt that horizontal mergers between direct 
competitors can harm competition, application of this traditional economic and 
antitrust analysis resulted in a wave of antitrust enforcement losses in hospital 
merger challenges followed by more than a decade-long hiatus in health care 
merger enforcement.55  
The wave of failed challenges by federal and state antitrust authorities to 
horizontal provider acquisitions led to the birth of new economic studies and 
analyses demonstrating how such horizontal provider mergers could lead to 
price increases, with no corresponding efficiencies, under a two-stage model of 
health care markets.56 The two-stage model divides the competitive dynamic in 
health care markets into two stages: the first stage in which payors bargain with 
providers over inclusion in a payor’s network on both price and non-price 
considerations, and the second stage in which patients pick providers primarily 
based on non-price considerations.57 Because of the ubiquity of employer-based 
health coverage and managed care, large employers often sponsor their own 
 
 45. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
 46. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 44, at 7–8, 13. 
 47. Id. at 17. 
 48. Id. at 18–19. 
 49. Id. at 3. 
 50. Id. at 29–31. 
 51. Merger-specific efficiency gains include cost savings, quality improvements, and other 
pro-competitive effects. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 44, at 29–30. 
 52. Unilateral effects examine whether the merged firm would have the ability to increase 
prices or reduce output on its own. Id. at 20. 
 53. Coordinated effects examine whether the merger would facilitate future collusion among 
market participants. Id. at 25. 
 54. Id. at 14; LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, AN INTEGRATED 
HANDBOOK 509 (3d ed. 2016). 
 55. Capps, supra note 32, at 444. 
 56. See, e.g., id. at 444–48, 460; see also, e.g., Steven Tenn, The Price Effects of Hospital 
Mergers: A Case Study of the Sutter-Summit Transaction, 18 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 65, 71–72, 79 
(2011). 
 57. See, e.g., Gregory Vistnes, Hospitals, Mergers, and Two-Stage Competition, 67 
ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 673 (2000). 
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health plans by creating or contracting with a network of providers to offer 
health care services to employees.58  
The first stage does not ignore the preferences of the individual consumer. 
Employers need their health plans to have provider networks robust enough for 
their employees to have options for obtaining services from providers close to 
where they live.59 By shifting the focus of competitive impact from consumers 
to health plans, the two-stage model illustrates how acquisitions enable health 
care providers to gain leverage in their negotiations with insurers by negotiating 
on an all-or-nothing basis, such that if the insurer does not accept the terms set 
by the provider system, the system will prevent any of its providers from 
participating in the insurer’s network. All-or-nothing negotiations threaten to 
create holes in the insurer’s provider network, and a new acquisition threatens 
the creation of an even larger hole thereby increasing the hospital system’s 
negotiating position and market power. Further, the acquisition leaves fewer 
options for insurers to turn to if the acquiring entity raises its prices post-
acquisition.60 
A number of economic studies have demonstrated a clear relationship 
between horizontal hospital consolidation and increased prices. In a 2012 review 
of the literature, Martin Gaynor and Robert Town concluded that “increases in 
hospital market concentration lead to increases in the price of hospital care.”61 
Studies found that hospital mergers in concentrated markets experienced 
significant price increases in excess of twenty percent compared to non-merging 
control hospitals.62 Additional studies from this time period further suggested 
that hospital concentration can lead to reductions in quality.63 Gaynor and 
 
 58. See Paul Fronstin, Self-Insured Health Plans: Recent Trends by Firm Size, EMP. BENEFIT 
RES. INST. NOTES (Emp. Benefit Research Inst., Washington, D.C.), July 2016, at 2. 
 59. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 341–42 (3d 
Cir. 2016); see also United States v. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 196, 204, 223 (D.D.C. 
2017), aff’d, 855 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 60. See, e.g., Cory Capps et al., Competition and Market Power in Option Demand Markets, 
34 RAND J. ECON. 737, 757, 760 (2003). 
 61. MARTIN GAYNOR & ROBERT TOWN, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., THE IMPACT OF 
HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION—UPDATE 1 (June 2012), https://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/re 
ports/issue_briefs/2012/rwjf73261. 
 62. Id. at 2 (reporting that “[m]erging hospitals had 40% higher prices than non-merging 
hospitals”) (citing Leemore Dafny, Estimation and Identification of Merger Effects: An Application 
to Hospital Mergers, 52 J.L. & ECON. 523, 544 (2009)); see also Deborah Haas-Wilson & 
Christopher Garmon, Hospital Mergers and Competitive Effects: Two Retrospective Analyses, 18 
INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 17, 27–30 (2011); Tenn, supra note 56, at 76 (finding that following the merger 
of Summit and Sutter in California, Summit raised its prices 28.4% to 44.2% compared to the 
control). 
 63. WILLIAM B. VOGT & ROBERT TOWN, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., HOW HAS 
HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION AFFECTED THE PRICE AND QUALITY OF HOSPITAL CARE? 9 (Feb. 
2006), https://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2006/rwjf12056/subassets/rwj 
f12056_1; GAYNOR & TOWN, supra note 61, at 4–5. 
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Town’s synthesis of the literature in 2012 confirmed earlier studies from the 
1990s and early 2000s providing evidence that hospital consolidation 
significantly raised prices.64 
From this body of research, economists developed a new set of analytical 
tools for assessing competition in health care markets.65 Based on the two-stage 
model of health care markets, economists developed a means to model and 
empirically measure the leverage gained by providers over insurers following 
horizontal provider acquisitions.66 These analytical tools—willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) analysis, hospital merger simulation, and diversion analysis—provided 
a clearer understanding of how health care entities bargain, negotiate, and 
compete.67 The shift in focus from the consumer to the impact of the merger on 
the health plan’s ability to negotiate with entities for inclusion in its network 
greatly contributed to the agencies’ ability to more effectively enforce antitrust 
laws in those markets.68 The use of these models to analyze provider mergers 
between direct competitors supported a series of decisions barring horizontal 
provider mergers from federal appellate courts in the Third,69 Sixth,70 Seventh,71 
and Ninth Circuits.72  
B. Vertical Merger Enforcement 
Vertical merger analysis has also gained much from the shift in viewpoint 
from analyzing the impact of the merger on the health care consumer to the 
impact on the ability of a payor to negotiate with the merged entity for network 
inclusion. Unlike horizontal mergers, vertical mergers occur between entities 
that do not directly compete with one another.73 Instead, they provide different 
 
 64. GAYNOR & TOWN, supra note 61, at 1–2. 
 65. Capps, supra note 32, at 446. 
 66. See, e.g., Capps et al., supra note 60, at 760. 
 67. See, e.g., Capps, supra note 32, at 446. 
 68. See id. at 446–47. 
 69. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 339–43, 340 n.3, 353 
(3d Cir. 2016); Brief of Amicus Curiae Economics Professors in Support of Plaintiffs/Appellants 
at 9–10, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. 2016) (No. 
16-2365), 2016 WL 3251948, at *3. 
 70. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 749 F.3d 559, 571–72 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(relying on insurer testimony as to the two-stage market). 
 71. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 460, 465–66, 468, 470, 
476 (7th Cir. 2016); Brief of Amicus Curiae Submitted by Thirty-Three Economists in Support of 
the FTC and State of Illinois at 8, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 
460 (7th Cir. 2016) (No. 16-2492), 2016 WL 3996861, at *6–9, *11–12, *16–17. 
 72. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 784 
& n.10, 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2015); Brief of Amicus Curiae Economics Professors in Support of 
Plaintiffs/Appellees at 6, Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 
778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-35173), 2014 WL 4312204, at *6. 
 73. WHITE ET AL., supra note 40, at § 3-6. 
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but complementary elements of an economic supply chain.74 While hospitals 
and physician groups are not in a classically vertical relationship, in that 
hospitals do not purchase services from physicians, physicians supply a crucial 
component of hospital services, and a clear relationship exists between the two 
entities.75 Hospitals provide facilities free of charge for physicians to treat their 
patients, and physicians refer their patients to hospitals.76  
The traditional view among antitrust enforcers is that vertical mergers can 
promote competition (or at least be competitively neutral) because 
“arrangements of integrated providers can provide tremendous procompetitive 
benefits.”77 Under optimal conditions, vertical integration should improve 
product and pricing efficiency by lowering transaction costs, promoting quality 
enhancement, eliminating overhead and redundancies, and improving 
coordination.78  
However, the relationship between the hospital and the physician group also 
has the potential to increase the market power of the merged entity vis-a-vis the 
payor trying to build a network for its health plan, which can drive up health 
care costs.79 Vertical mergers can threaten competition if the merger enhances 
the merged entity’s ability to foreclose competitors, engage in collusion, evade 
rate regulation, or raise competitors’ costs in upstream or downstream markets.80 
Health services research in recent years supports this notion by demonstrating 
that hospital acquisitions of physician groups are associated with price increases 
for both the hospitals and the physicians, rather than efficiency gains.81 These 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Thomas L. Greaney & Douglas Ross, Navigating Through the Fog of Vertical Merger 
Law: A Guide to Counselling Hospital-Physician Consolidation Under the Clayton Act, 91 WASH. 
L. REV. 199, 206–07 (2016). 
 76. Id. at 206. 
 77. WHITE ET AL., supra note 40, at § 3-6 (quoting Christine A. Varney, Comm’r, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Remarks Before the Health Care Antitrust Forum, Chicago, Illinois (May 2, 1995)). 
 78. See Martin Gaynor, Is Vertical Integration Anticompetitive? Definitely Maybe (But That’s 
Not Final), 25 J. HEALTH ECON. 175, 177 (2006); see also Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, 
Quality-Enhancing Merger Efficiencies, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1969, 1983–84 (2015). 
 79. See Esther Gal-Or, The Profitability of Vertical Mergers Between Hospitals and Physician 
Practices, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 623, 629 (1999). 
 80. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 549, 552–53. 
 81. See, e.g., Laurence C. Baker et al., Vertical Integration: Hospital Ownership of Physician 
Practices is Associated with Higher Prices and Spending, 33 HEALTH AFF. 756, 762 (2014) 
(finding hospital ownership of physicians is associated with higher hospital prices and spending); 
James C. Robinson & Kelly Miller, Total Expenditures per Patient in Hospital-Owned and 
Physician-Owned Physician Organizations in California, 312 JAMA 1663, 1668 (2014) (finding 
hospital-owned physician organizations had ten to twenty percent higher total expenditures per 
patient than physician-owned organizations); Cory Capps et al., The Effect of Hospital Acquisitions 
of Physician Practices on Prices and Spending 3 (Inst. for Policy Res., Nw. U., Working Paper No. 
WP-15-02, Feb. 2015) (finding that vertical integration was associated with a 13.7% increase in 
physician prices); Hannah T. Neprash et al., Association of Financial Integration Between 
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studies provided evidence that the price increases driven by hospital-physician 
mergers were due to the enhanced market power of the integrated provider entity 
when negotiating with payors.82  
While the agencies are aware that vertical mergers can harm competition, 
how to evaluate the competitive effect of a vertical health care merger remains 
largely uncertain, especially in light of the potential for pro-competitive 
efficiencies and the need to balance those against potential anti-competitive 
harms.83 As a result, vertical mergers in health care have rarely been challenged 
directly. In Saint Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health 
System, Ltd., the Ninth Circuit prohibited the acquisition of Saltzer, the largest 
and most prestigious group of primary care physicians in Nampa, Idaho, solely 
on horizontal grounds (the merger of Saltzer with the hospital’s existing 
physician group), rather than addressing the potential harms raised by the 
vertical aspects of the merger.84 While antitrust agencies have not yet brought a 
pre-merger challenge to a vertical health care merger, they have imposed 
behavioral conditions on vertical mergers in exchange for allowing such mergers 
to proceed.85 Through these actions, enforcers have acknowledged that vertical 
mergers in health care between entities that do not compete in the same product 
market can result in anti-competitive harm as a result of increased negotiating 
power with payors. This development is significant because it further opens the 
door to the possibility that cross-market mergers of entities with related products 
that do not compete in the same product or geographic market could harm 
competition.   
 
Physicians and Hospitals with Commercial Health Care Prices, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1932, 
1936 (2015) (finding that metropolitan statistical areas with increases in physician-hospital 
integration experienced median price increases of seventy-five dollars). 
 82. See Capps et al., supra note 81, at 3, 5–7, 36 (finding that physician price increases 
following acquisition by hospitals were greater as the size of the acquiring hospital’s market share 
increased, perhaps due to increase in willingness to pay for the integrated entity’s services); 
Robinson & Miller, supra note 81, at 1668 (noting that the larger the market share of the hospital-
owner, the greater the increase in per-patient expenditures due to hospital-physician integration); 
Neprash et al., supra note 81, at 1937 (noting that commercial price differences were greater than 
price differences for Medicare, suggesting that the price increases were the result of enhanced 
market power of integrated providers, not just the fact that Medicare policy paid higher prices for 
outpatient services provided by physicians acquired by hospitals). 
 83. See Greaney & Ross, supra note 75, at 201–02. 
 84. Saint Alphonsus Medical Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 
781–82, 792–93 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 85. See Amended Final Order at 2, Penn. v. Geisinger Health Sys. Found., No 1:13 CV-02647-
YK (M.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2013); Final Order at 6–18, Penn. v. Urology of Cent. Penn., Inc., No. 1:11-
cv-01625-JEJ (M.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2011). 
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C. Cross-Market Merger Enforcement   
Like horizontal and vertical merger enforcement, antitrust enforcement of 
cross-market mergers should evolve alongside current understanding of the 
economic and market forces. If economic theory and empirical evidence 
supported a claim that cross-market health care mergers could harm competition, 
U.S. antitrust precedents would allow enforcement agencies to challenge a 
particular cross-market merger that threatened harm to competition. As noted 
above, Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits all mergers or other combinations 
of entities where the effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to 
tend to create a monopoly.”86 Merger analysis turns on whether the 
consolidation is likely to harm competition by enhancing the opportunity for 
collusion or enabling the resulting entity to exercise market power through 
increasing prices, restraining output, or stifling innovation.87  
One mechanism by which cross-market mergers can harm both consumers 
and competition is through anti-competitive tying. Tying arrangements occur 
when the seller of multiple goods and services conditions the sale of one good 
or service (“the tying product”) on the purchase of another good or service (“the 
tied product”).88 The essence of an antitrust tying claim is that the seller is using 
its market power in the tying product market to influence sales in the tied product 
market.89 In a cross-market merger, in which a hospital system acquires another 
hospital in a different geographic market, the potential for tying arises when the 
newly merged entity then negotiates with insurance companies on an all-or-
nothing basis, such that an insurer must include all of the hospital system’s 
providers in its network or none at all. Large, multi-hospital systems often 
include hospitals or provider organizations that are “must have” entities, such 
that an insurer could not build a successful network without them.90 Must-have 
providers generate significant market power for their health systems, which can 
extend to all other providers within the system via contracting.91 For instance, 
large hospital systems that engage in “all-or-nothing” contracting have 
reportedly added anti-tiering provisions to their contracts with payors to prevent 
the payor from accepting all system providers at inflated rates and then 
developing tiered benefit packages that incentivize plan participants to select 
 
 86. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
 87. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2 
(Aug. 19, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819 
hmg.pdf. 
 88. WHITE ET AL., supra note 40, at § 9-2(c). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See Robert A. Berenson et al., The Growing Power of Some Providers to Win Steep 
Payment Increases from Insurers Suggests Policy Remedies May Be Needed, 31 HEALTH AFF. 973, 
973 (2012). 
 91. See id. at 973, 978. 
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lower priced alternatives.92 The possibility of anti-competitive tying exists when 
a health system spans several geographic and product markets and contracts with 
insurers or customers that also span those markets.93  
While tying claims are most frequently brought under Sherman Act Section 
1 which prohibits contracts “in restraint of trade,”94 the probable anti-
competitive effects resulting from tying can justify a merger challenge under the 
Clayton Act Section 7.95 Section 7 does not require proof of anti-competitive 
behavior but rather permits courts to predict the likely competitive impact of a 
proposed merger or acquisition based on past conduct, present facts, and 
economic modeling. Courts only require evidence of a probable future adverse 
impact on competition.96 Therefore, if economic theory and research support a 
claim that a cross-market merger posed a substantial threat to competition, the 
agencies would have the legal basis to bring a pre-merger challenge.  
III.  THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BASES FOR CONSIDERING THE ANTI-
COMPETITIVE POTENTIAL OF CROSS-MARKET MERGERS IN HEALTH CARE 
 Traditionally, antitrust challenges to cross-market mergers were not 
viable, regardless of whether the case law would permit such a challenge, 
because of the paucity of economic theory and empirical data to support the 
notion that cross-market mergers could be anti-competitive. This state of affairs, 
however, is ripe for review. 
Recent breakthroughs in health economics offer both theoretical and 
empirical descriptions of how cross-market acquisitions in health care can 
increase prices when a common insurer or common customer purchases products 
or services supplied by both entities.97 First, Vistnes and Sarafidis modeled how 
a hospital system can, as a theoretical matter, increase prices after acquiring 
providers in a different geographic market.98 In 2016, Dafny, Ho, and Lee 
expanded upon Vistnes and Sarafidis’ model and findings from Ho and Lee’s 
earlier research,99 demonstrating that the merger of hospitals in different 
 
 92. Glenn A. Melnick & Katya Fonkych, Hospital Prices Increase in California, Especially 
Among Hospitals in the Largest Multi-Hospital Systems, 53 INQUIRY 1, 5 (2016). 
 93. As Part II discusses, anti-competitive tying is not the only mechanism through which a 
cross-market merger could harm competition, but it currently is the best understood one. See infra 
Part II. 
 94. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 95. Id. at § 18. 
 96. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962); Peter C. Carstensen, The 
Philadelphia National Bank Presumption: Merger Analysis in an Unpredictable World, 80 
ANTITRUST L.J. 219, 239–40 (2015). 
 97. See, e.g., Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 10, at 260; Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 
29. 
 98. Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 10, at 293. 
 99. Kate Ho & Robin S. Lee, Insurer Competition in Healthcare Markets (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 19401, 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w19401.pdf. 
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geographic markets could influence insurer reimbursement rates if those insurers 
had customers (employers) who employed workers in both markets.100 Dafny, 
Ho, and Lee theorized that cross-market health care mergers could have anti-
competitive effects if the health care system and the acquired provider: (1) 
bargained with common insurers for network inclusion; and/or (2) had 
customers in common, i.e., firms with employees in both markets.101 The anti-
competitive potential results from the ability of the newly merged entity to sell 
(or refuse to sell) both the products in ways that increase the utility of  (or 
disutility of not) having both products beyond the sum of their independent 
utilities.102 In many respects, this resembles anti-competitive tying. Additional 
studies by Matthew Lewis and Kevin Pflum, and Glenn Melnick and Katya 
Fonkych also provide empirical evidence that cross-market mergers can be anti-
competitive.103  
To understand the joint utility loss, imagine that you must choose a health 
plan for your family, and you care most about a network that covers both your 
kids’ pediatrician and your cardiologist. A plan that includes both is the most 
desirable, a plan that includes one or the other has slightly less value, but you 
will not accept a plan that includes neither. A plan that includes both the 
pediatrician and the cardiologist would provide the most utility, whereas a plan 
with neither would have even less utility than the sum of the utility lost in plans 
that lacked either the pediatrician or the cardiologist. Dafny, Ho, and Lee call 
this the “common customer effect.”104  
The common customer effect is experienced by large employers and 
insurance companies that must negotiate reimbursement rates with merging 
health care providers. Employers with employees working across numerous 
geographic markets seek plans with networks that provide the greatest value 
across all markets. To these employers, the overall provider bundle or network 
is the product, such that they consider whether one provider bundle is 
substitutable for another rather than any particular provider in one geographic 
market.105 As a result, insurers have incentives to build networks that include 
key providers for employers even when they are not in the same geographic 
 
 100. Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 2–3. 
 101. Id. at 5–6. 
 102. See id. at 5. 
 103. Lewis & Pflum, supra note 14, at 603–04; Melnick & Fonkych, supra note 92, at 6. 
 104. Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 9–11. Dafny, Ho, and Lee also hypothesized that the 
same theory would also apply when there are no common customers but instead common insurers—
the common insurer effect. Id. at 12. In this scenario, cross-market mergers could enable a hospital 
system to recoup revenues lost due to political or legislative constraints in one market (caps on 
increases) by acquiring a hospital in a non-constrained market, and then increasing rates in the non-
constrained hospital and requiring all insurers to include both hospitals in their networks. Id. at 12, 
14. 
 105. See id. at 2. 
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market. Similar to the example above, an acquisition linking two hospitals in 
distinct geographic markets together for negotiating purposes could make the 
loss of both hospitals from the network greater than the sum of the losses of each 
hospital independently in the absence of the acquisition.106 This effect can 
manifest through health plan premiums as the health plan must either raise 
premiums to accommodate the increased provider costs from the merged entity 
or lower premiums to account for the holes in the network and compromise 
health plan profits.107 As a result, for example, a large health care system in 
Northern California with market power in one or more counties could require 
insurers, such as Aetna or Blue Shield, to include newly-acquired providers in 
Central and Southern California in their networks at increased prices. The 
newly-acquired providers could raise prices by taking advantage of the 
bargaining leverage of the acquiring health care system, which stems from the 
threat of more significant network holes if the system leaves a provider network 
en masse.108 Importantly, the common customer effect results from a change in 
the parties’ bargaining options, not from increased negotiating skill, which 
opens the door to antitrust enforcement.109  
Over time, aspects of this theory have been borne out both theoretically and 
empirically. To test their hypotheses, Dafny, Ho, and Lee examined two distinct 
samples of acute care hospital mergers over the period of 1996 to 2010 and the 
price trajectories after those mergers for three groups of hospitals: “(i) hospitals 
acquiring a new system member in the same state but not the same narrow 
geographic market (‘adjacent treatment hospitals’); (ii) hospitals acquiring a 
new system member out of state (‘non-adjacent treatment hospitals’); and (iii) 
hospitals that are not members of ‘target’ (i.e., acquired) or acquiring 
systems.”110 Dafny, Ho, and Lee found that a merger between hospitals in 
different geographic regions within the same state with common customers or 
common insurers led to significant price increases of seven to ten percent 
compared with control hospitals that were not part of a merger.111 The authors 
observed this price effect in “bystander” hospitals, which were part of the 
 
 106. See id. at 4. 
 107. Argue & Stein, supra note 11, at 28; see also Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 36. 
Interestingly, the economists appear to differ on the underlying mechanism resulting in the ability 
of cross-market mergers to compromise health plan profits. Dafny, Ho, and Lee argue that it results 
from a “change in parties’ outside options (or threat points) when bargaining.” Id. at 4. Lewis and 
Pflum contend that the increase in bargaining power results from system membership either via all-
or-nothing bargaining or altering the bargaining power of a particular hospital in the system. See 
Lewis & Pflum, supra note 14, at 602. Regardless of the mechanism, the ability to create network 
holes and demand higher reimbursements remains. 
 108. See Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 6, 12. 
 109. See id. at 4. 
 110. Id. at 3. 
 111. Id. 
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merging system, but not the “crown jewel” motivating the acquisitions.112 The 
closer in geographic proximity the merging parties were to each other, the larger 
the price effects.113 The price effects of the cross-market health care mergers 
provide empirical evidence that the health system’s market power increases 
when it adds more providers due to the ability to tie (or “pull through”) the 
system’s acquired providers to its strongest “must-have” providers when 
bargaining with health plans. Correspondingly, increasing the number of 
preferred providers in a system increases the number and significance of 
network holes the merged health system can threaten if the health plan does not 
accept the health system’s higher prices.  
Dafny, Ho, and Lee’s seminal study is not an outlier. An earlier study by 
Lewis and Pflum estimated that health care systems can raise prices more for an 
acquired provider in a different geographic market than a comparable hospital 
does when it acquires a close competitor within the same market.114 In other 
words, Lewis and Pflum found that cross-market provider acquisitions in some 
instances could lead to greater price increases and thus be more anti-competitive 
than even horizontal provider acquisitions involving direct competitors. Lewis 
and Pflum then released a second study further evaluating the price effects from 
cross-market acquisitions, which found that “prices at hospitals acquired by out-
of-market systems increased by about 17% more than unacquired, stand-alone 
hospitals.”115  
Furthermore, Melnick and Fonkych, in their study of hospital prices in 
California, found that “the market power effects of large hospital systems do not 
necessarily require consolidation between local competitors.”116 Their study 
revealed that many of the hospitals in California’s largest systems do not 
substantially overlap with other system hospitals in terms of product and 
geographic markets.117 The authors concluded that “hospitals in large hospital 
 
 112. Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 17. 
 113. Id. at 3, 25. This study also theorized that due to the double-marginalization problem, the 
health care system’s acquisition of a provider in a new geographic market might allow it to retain 
profits that it would otherwise cede to insurers and thereby raise prices. See id. at 12–13. 
 114. Lewis & Pflum, supra note 19, at 244, 246; see id. at 248–57 (modeling based on the 
auction model used for horizontal provider mergers to value access to hospitals on an estimate of 
the cost function for multi-product firms in general and hospitals, and on bargaining models, in 
turn, based on the assumption that insurers try to get nearly every hospital into their networks); id. 
at 257 (using data from sources such as the American Hospital Association and the California 
Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development); id. at 266 (“Our results also indicate that, 
in addition to improving their bargaining position by increasing concentration within a local patient 
market, system hospitals have significantly higher bargaining power and extract roughly 30 percent 
more of the surplus generated by the hospital-[insurer] relationship than comparable nonsystem 
hospitals.”). 
 115. Lewis & Pflum, supra note 14, at 579. 
 116. Melnick & Fonkych, supra note 92, at 6. 
 117. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2017] THE ANTI-COMPETITIVE POTENTIAL OF CROSS-MARKET MERGERS 61 
systems, by tying their hospitals together, are able to achieve market power over 
prices beyond any local market advantages.”118 While these findings advance 
understanding of the economic underpinnings of the U.S. health care system, 
whether antitrust enforcers can use these findings to address the anti-competitive 
effects of cross-market acquisitions by health care systems remains a legal 
question for enforcers and courts to resolve.  
IV.  THE POTENTIAL FOR CROSS-MARKET ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
 Even with new economic evidence suggesting that cross-market mergers 
have the potential to harm competition in health care markets and a legal 
foundation for bringing a claim, bringing a successful cross-market merger 
challenge is easier said than done. Several economic and legal hurdles remain. 
First, some skepticism in academic and enforcement circles remains about 
whether cross-market mergers can be anti-competitive.119 Second, an antitrust 
enforcer seeking to challenge a cross-market merger must convince her 
colleagues that the proposed merger presents a significantly higher risk to 
competition than other potential health care merger challenges as to warrant use 
of scarce agency resources on a case with a less clearly trodden path through 
litigation. Third, while the Clayton Act provides a legal basis to challenge a 
cross-market merger,120 successfully litigating the suit will require the 
development of new economic and legal analytic frameworks and tools for 
analyzing the potential impact of a cross-market merger to the provider system’s 
ability to negotiate prices with insurers and employers. As economists continue 
to conduct research on cross-market mergers and develop models to determine 
their potential impact, the legal academy and antitrust enforcers should similarly 
evaluate this research to determine whether and how a cross-market merger 
challenge should be brought. As economists, lawyers, and academics develop 
the economic and legal tools needed to build a strong cross-market merger 
challenge and overcome the third hurdle, the first two hurdles should diminish 
substantially. As the economic analysis increasingly demonstrates the anti-
competitive potential of certain cross-market mergers, skepticism will diminish, 
and the relative importance of bringing a challenge will increase. The rest of this 
section highlights areas for further consideration, research, and analysis. 
 
 118. Id. The authors noted that their study did not control for quality, technological, and 
financial differences between the hospitals in large systems and other hospitals, but their study did 
include quality differences at the end, which had a minimal effect on price differences. Id. 
 119. See, e.g., Argue & Stein, supra note 11, at 25. 
 120. See supra Section I.C. 
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A. Reframing Traditional Merger Analysis 
Typically, in hospital mergers, courts examine the impact of the merger in 
terms of its impact on the relevant product and geographic markets.121 For 
instance, the acquisition of an additional hospital by a large, multi-hospital 
system could be analyzed in terms of its impact on the price for acute care 
services (the product market) in Marin County, California (the geographic 
market). However, the analysis should shift when analyzing cross-market 
mergers, as the merging entities do not compete in the same product and 
geographic markets. Instead, antitrust enforcers should consider analyzing the 
merger based on the potential direct effect it might have on the value of the 
bundle of services offered by the hospital system to insurers for inclusion in their 
network. For the Common Customer or Common Insurer, what matters is the 
market leverage gained by the merged health care entity in terms of negotiating 
reimbursement rates and network inclusion. How much does the addition of the 
entity being acquired increase the bargaining position of the acquiring system 
when negotiating with insurers and employers? Just as the value of adding an 
additional player to a basketball team depends on the player’s skills, who else is 
on the team, and the existing team chemistry, the value of adding a provider to 
an existing system will depend not only on the value of the entity being acquired 
itself, but also on the value of the other individual entities in the acquiring system 
and the overarching value of the entire post-merger entity. To determine the 
impact on market power and competition, antitrust enforcers should develop a 
means to determine the value of a particular acquisition to an entire system—to 
show the relative value of the target entity in the market (its market power) and 
then how much value it adds to the system given the other entities in the system, 
and the cumulative loss experienced by an insurer or employer from not having 
any of those entities in its network.  
Developing such a valuation mechanism will be challenging and must factor 
in an array of conditions. For instance, state network adequacy laws can 
significantly affect the value of a particular acquisition to a health system and 
should be factored into any analysis.122 Relatedly, the status of an entity as a 
“must have” provider, one that is essential to a network, can strongly affect the 
 
 121. E.g., WHITE ET AL., supra note 40, at 67–68. 
 122. Network adequacy laws regulate health plans’ ability to provide enrollees with timely and 
reasonably close access to a sufficient number of in-network primary care and specialty physicians, 
and hospital and other health care services included under the terms of the contract. See, e.g., Ashley 
Noble, Insurance Carriers and Access to Health Care Providers: Network Adequacy, NAT’L CONF. 
ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/insurance-carriers-and-ac 
cess-to-healthcare-providers-network-adequacy.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2017). More stringent 
network adequacy requirements mean that the value of any essential provider or group of physicians 
will increase if they cannot be excluded from the insurer’s network under the state requirements. 
See, e.g., id. 
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market power of the acquiring merged health system.123 Furthermore, the value 
analysis should be able to model the value of a particular acquisition in two 
alternate conditions: (1) in the instance that the merged system engages in all-
or-nothing bargaining and (2) in the instance that the merged system allows 
insurers and employers to contract for services from its subsidiary entities 
individually. In sum, the value analysis will require economic modeling that 
accounts for both the complexities in cross-market mergers as well as the legally 
relevant variables in any particular case.  
B. Model Insurer Willingness to Pay in Cross-Market Mergers 
Successful merger challenges typically require economic modeling to 
predict the impact of the merger on the relevant market. Historically, most 
research examining the impact of provider consolidation on health care prices 
focused on traditional horizontal mergers.124 Initially, these studies examined 
the relationship between prices and market concentration, usually measured by 
the HHI.125 More recent studies utilized structural models that account for the 
fact that provider reimbursement rates often result from complex negotiations 
between providers (hospitals or hospitals systems) and managed care 
organizations.126 These structural models value the market power of a particular 
 
 123. Morgan A. Muir et al., Clarifying Costs: Can Increased Price Transparency Reduce 
Healthcare Spending? 4 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 319, 329, 353 (2013). 
 124. E.g., Lewis & Pflum, supra note 14, at 579–80; see also, e.g., David Dranove et al., Price 
and Concentration in Hospital Markets: The Switch from Patient-Driven to Payer-Driven 
Competition, J.L. & ECON. 179, 180–81 (1993); William J. Lynk, The Creation of Economic 
Efficiencies in Hospital Mergers, 14 J. HEALTH ECON. 507, 507–09 (1995); David Dranove & 
Richard Ludwick, Competition and Pricing by Nonprofit Hospitals: A Reassessment of Lynk’s 
Analysis, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 87, 87–88 (1995); Alison Evans Cuellar & Paul J. Gertler, How the 
Expansion of Hospital Systems Has Affected Consumers, 24 HEALTH AFF. 213, 213–15 (2005); 
Glenn Melnick & Emmett Keeler, The Effects of Multi-Hospital Systems on Hospital Prices, 26 J. 
HEALTH ECON. 400, 401 (2007). 
 125. HHI is calculated as the sum of the squared market share of each entity or health system 
in a given market multiplied by 10,000. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 
29, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/atr/herfindahl-hirschman-index (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). For 
hospitals, market share is calculated as proportional share of inpatient admissions or patient days 
possessed by a hospital relative the rest of the market. See Lewis & Pflum, supra note 14, at 597. 
Typically, a market is considered “highly concentrated” if the HHI is greater than 2500, which 
means there are about four equal sized hospital owners in a given market. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
supra. A market is “moderately concentrated” if its HHI is between 1500 and 2500. Id. 
 126. E.g., Lewis & Pflum, supra note 14, at 579–80; see also, e.g., John M. Brooks et al., 
Hospital-Insurer Bargaining: An Empirical Investigation of Appendectomy Pricing, 16 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 417, 418–19 (1997); Robert Town & Gregory Vistnes, Hospital Competition in HMO 
Networks, 20 J. HEALTH ECON. 733, 734 (2001); Capps et al., supra note 60, at 737–39; Katherine 
Ho, Insurer-Provider Networks in the Medical Care Market, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 393 (Mar. 
2009); Lewis & Pflum, supra note 19, at 245; Gautam Gowrisankaran et al., Mergers when Prices 
Are Negotiated: Evidence from the Hospital Industry, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 172, 173 (Jan. 2015). 
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provider organization based on a managed care enrollee’s “willingness to pay,” 
which evaluates how much more the enrollee would be willing to pay to have 
access to that hospital as opposed to going to the next best alternative for care.127 
These models have become widely adopted by antitrust authorities in evaluating 
the impact of potential hospital and health system mergers.128  
WTP analysis helps elucidate the two mechanisms by which hospital system 
formation can affect the negotiated price.129 First, when hospitals merge into a 
system, they typically negotiate with insurers and managed care organizations 
on an all-or-nothing basis, such that the insurer must include all member 
hospitals into its networks or none at all.130 When the merging hospitals are in a 
single geographic market, all-or-nothing bargaining means that enrollees cannot 
substitute one hospital for another in the system, thereby limiting their options. 
This makes the option value of having access to all hospitals in the system 
greater than the sum of the option values for having access to only one of the 
system hospitals if the other hospitals remained in the network.131 Second, 
membership in a health system can alter the bargaining power of a member 
hospital.132 This increase in bargaining power can result from system 
membership via improved information on prior contract negotiations and gained 
knowledge of agreements between the system and the insurer or employer 
regarding other providers in the system, and increased negotiating skill.133  
Both of these mechanisms can also affect price negotiations in cross-market 
mergers involving health systems. First, cross-market mergers can alter the 
bargaining position of the acquiring health system when negotiating with a large 
employer with employees in different markets or their insurer.134 While 
individual enrollees will not view providers in different markets as substitutable, 
a large employer or an insurance company looking to build an attractive network 
for a large employer will highly value a health system with providers in all the 
markets where its employees live.135 Second, the same potential benefits from 
improved information, negotiating skill, capital access, and knowledge of prior 
 
 127. See Lewis & Pflum, supra note 19, at 244. 
 128. E.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 460, 476 (7th Cir. 
2016); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 342, 353 (3d Cir. 2016); 
ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 749 F.3d 559, 567 (6th Cir. 2014); Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1086 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
 129. Matthew Lewis & Kevin Pflum, Hosptial Systems and Bargaining Power: Evidence from 
Out-of-Market Acquisitions 7 (Aug. 25, 2014) (working paper), http://www.unc.edu/~mcmanusb/ 
AppliedMicroSeminar/papers/Lewis_Pflum_hosp_bp.pdf. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 8. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See Vistnes & Sarafides, supra note 10, at 275; see also Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, 
at 2. 
 135. Lewis & Pflum, supra note 129, at 7–8. 
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and current contract terms can shift the bargaining power, and therefore the 
negotiated prices for newly-acquired member hospitals even if they are cross-
market acquisitions.136  
Unfortunately, initial models of WTP, based on the impact of system 
inclusion on an individual consumer, do not capture the potential anti-
competitive effects that may arise from cross-market mergers, as a particular 
consumer may not value the addition of providers in a different geographic 
area.137 Existing studies and recent antitrust analysis “assume[] that bargaining 
power is fixed and that enrollee willingness to pay is derived only from local 
hospital and market characteristics.”138 Under this assumption, the insurer’s 
WTP objective function is linear, and only mergers between hospitals that 
compete within the same geographic and product market can result in a price 
increase.139 However, the research by Dafny, Ho, and Lee, and Lewis and Pflum 
cast doubt on the assumption that the insurer’s WTP for a particular provider is 
in fact linear. Instead, their data suggested that the insurer’s WTP objective 
function would be concave in this scenario, enabling both within-market and 
cross-market mergers between hospitals sharing a common customer to result in 
higher WTP by insurers and price increases.140 The emerging economic 
evidence thus suggests that WTP analysis could be revised to encompass cross-
market health care mergers by shifting from a fixed to a dynamic model of 
bargaining power that can encompass multiple markets. 
Health economists working in this area should begin testing and validating 
the WTP models proposed by Dafny, Ho, and Lee, and determining whether the 
model applies to geographic cross-market hospital mergers, as well as health 
system acquisitions of physician groups. They should also try to incorporate 
legally relevant variables such as network adequacy laws and state insurance 
requirements. Further refining the economic models also offers the opportunity 
to develop potential limiting principles that will help identify anti-competitive 
cross-market mergers. 
C. Develop Limiting Principles 
Key limiting principles would delineate when cross-market acquisitions by 
provider systems should be proscribed under the antitrust laws as having likely 
anti-competitive effects. To trigger legal intervention and potential antitrust 
remedies, price increases must be due to abuses of market power, rather than 
quality improvements, better negotiating skills of the merged entity, greater 
 
 136. See id. at 8. 
 137. See id. at 2. 
 138. Id. at 8. 
 139. Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 8. 
 140. Id. at 5. 
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ability to bear risk, or other legitimate drivers of price.141 Health economists, 
legal academics, and antitrust enforcers should identify and test limiting 
principles to isolate acquisitions that are likely to have anti-competitive effects 
from those that are likely to have pro-competitive or neutral effects. Such 
limiting principles would provide important guidance to both antitrust enforcers 
and the health care community, and help avoid unnecessary costs and ineffectual 
results.142  
Several potential limiting principles have already arisen in economic 
research and case law. First, Dafny, Ho, and Lee’s research suggests that there 
must be a common customer with employees or insureds that span the markets 
served by the merging entities.143 Second, existing case law and economic 
research also recommend considering whether the acquiring entity had market 
power in one or more markets prior to the acquisition.144 Researchers and 
 
 141. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 30–31. 
 142. See Eric A. Posner, Fiona Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the Anti-
Competitive Power of Institutional Investors, ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 9–10, 
46–47) (advocating that hedge fund investment in oligopolistic industries be barred under Section 
7 only if certain limiting principles are not present and noting that such principles are needed to 
avoid vast costs and uncertainty or ineffectual outcomes). 
 143. Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 5–6; see also Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 10, at 
274–75, 282 (discussing bargaining in a post cross-market acquisition situation where common 
employers are involved that must offer plans covering all their employees at the same price, no 
matter where those employees live in a state). 
 144. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 558–59 (1973) (Marshall, J., 
concurring); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION SUBMISSION FOR OECD ROUNDTABLE 
ON PORTFOLIO EFFECTS IN CONGLOMERATE MERGERS 20 (2001), https://www.justice.gov/sites/ 
default/files/atr/legacy/2015/01/26/9550.pdf (noting that any theory of competitive harm from 
tying in the General Electric-Honeywell merger depended on General Electric having market power 
in the market for large aircraft engines); Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 29 (“Prior researchers 
have shown that mergers of nearby, similar rivals can lead to increases in market power and higher 
prices. The existence of a common customer effect implies that market power may arise from 
combinations over even broader geographic areas and across product markets. This finding does 
not imply more expansive boundaries for mechanical calculations of market shares and ‘∆HHI’s 
used to evaluate whether mergers are likely to be anticompetitive; rather, we believe it favors an 
emphasis on the ‘direct effects’ likely to arise from a merger, a concept promulgated in the 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.”); Lewis & Pflum, supra note 129, at 3 (“Together the findings 
reveal that systems can have a significant impact on the market power of hospitals in ways that 
have not been studied or taken into consideration in recent antitrust analysis.”); id. at 37–38 (“Taken 
together, these findings indicate that there are important cross-market dependencies present in the 
market allowing hospitals to gain market power vis-à-vis MCOs in the price negotiation game by 
joining an out-of-market system.”); see also Einer Elhauge, Rehabilitating Jefferson Parish: Why 
Ties Without a Substantial Foreclosure Share Should Not Be Per Se Legal, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 463, 
505–06 (2016) (tying firm with market power in the tying market adversely impacts consumer 
welfare even if that tying conduct only impacts a non-trivial amount of sales in the tied product 
market); Christopher R. Leslie, Tying Conspiracies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2247, 2262 (2007) 
(explaining how tying conspiracies can allow firms with individually small market shares to 
exercise market power in the aggregate). 
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antitrust enforcers should consider whether designating a threshold of market 
power, such as thirty percent, would prove valuable to identifying cross-market 
acquisitions that substantially threaten competition, and are worthwhile to 
challenge. Dafny, Ho, and Lee do not suggest that a market share threshold is 
required for anti-competitive effects to be likely. However, antitrust enforcers 
may want to designate a market share threshold for practical purposes to help 
them identify the mergers that pose the most risk to competition. Third, due to 
state insurance laws that govern network adequacy, institute coverage mandates, 
and regulate insurance more generally, examining cross-market acquisitions of 
providers within the same state as the health care system may be a good starting 
point for analysis.145 This is not to say that only same-state, cross-market 
mergers can be anti-competitive, but initially this restriction may help simplify 
the analysis. Interestingly, Dafny, Ho, and Lee found that the closer the hospitals 
were “in terms of drive time,” the more likely employers are to have employees 
living in both locations or commuting between them.146 Disentangling the 
effects of driving distance from the effects of same-state acquisitions will prove 
very important in terms of limiting principles, as large employers often employ 
workers across state lines at distances that may be much smaller than the 
distance between merging entities in the same state. Antitrust enforcers, legal 
academics, and health economists should begin evaluating potential limiting 
principles to help develop the required legal framework for bringing a cross-
market challenge. 
CONCLUSION 
As understanding of the forces that shape health care markets evolve, so 
should the ability to protect those markets from anti-competitive behaviors. Now 
that economic research has provided empirical and theoretical support for the 
claim that cross-market mergers have the potential to lead to increased market 
power and increased prices, the time has come for the antitrust community to 
begin to evaluate this claim. Health care consolidation is a leading driver of 
health care costs in the United States.147 To develop effective health care reform, 
policymakers must have an understanding of all the ways that consolidation can 
influence market power and increase costs. Health economists, legal academics, 
and antitrust enforcers should begin examining this research to determine 
whether, under what circumstances, and how challenges to cross-market 
 
 145. See Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 10, at 292–93 (expressing doubt that the implications 
of the author’s modeling could apply to interstate cross-market acquisitions); cf. Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 49 (D.D.C. 2015) (finding both a nationwide market 
for food broadline distribution based on the shared characteristics of a core group of customers as 
well as intrastate local markets for food broadline distribution for other customers based on driving 
time). 
 146. Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 26. 
 147. See, e.g., GAYNOR & TOWN, supra note 61, at 1. 
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mergers should be brought to promote and protect competition in health care. 
This article outlines the hurdles to bringing such a challenge and identifies 
potential limiting factors for consideration. Developing the legal and economic 
frameworks needed to bring an antitrust enforcement suit will take time and 
cooperation, and the antitrust community should begin addressing these 
concerns now, before the consolidation further harms U.S. health care markets 
and increases costs. 
 
 
